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Abstract: The United States requires patients injured by medical negligence to seek compensa-
tion through lawsuits, an approach that has drawbacks related to fairness, cost, and impact on 
medical care. Several countries, including New Zealand, Sweden, and Denmark, have replaced 
litigation with administrative compensation systems for patients who experience an avoid-
able medical injury. Sometimes called “no-fault” systems, such schemes enable patients to file 
claims for compensation without using an attorney. A governmental or private adjudicating 
organization uses neutral medical experts to evaluate claims of injury and does not require 
patients to prove that health care providers were negligent in order to receive compensation. 
Information from claims is used to analyze opportunities for patient safety improvement. 
The systems have successfully limited liability costs while improving injured patients’ access 
to compensation. American policymakers may find many of the elements of these countries’ 
systems to be transferable to demonstration projects in the U.S.
                    
INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice reform is a perennial issue for state legislatures and, more 
recently, for the U.S. Congress. The American medical liability system is widely 
acknowledged to perform poorly in several important respects.1,2 Few patients with 
injuries due to negligence file claims, in part because of the difficulty of obtaining 
attorney representation and the arduousness of the litigation process. Many meritori-
ous cases do not result in compensation to the patient, while many non-meritorious 
cases do lead to settlements or jury awards. The amounts awarded are highly variable 
across similar injuries, inadequate in some cases and excessive in others. The highly 
adversarial litigation process destroys physician–patient relationships and involves 
considerable emotional strain for both plaintiffs and defendants. Fear of litigation 
chills open discussion about medical errors, resulting in missed opportunities for 
learning and patient safety improvement, and leads physicians to order extra tests, 
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referrals, and other services primarily for the purpose of 
reducing their liability exposure. Such defensive medi-
cine, together with the high cost of malpractice insurance 
premiums that increases providers’ overhead costs and 
the prices they charge, contributes to the upward growth 
of health care expenditures. It is estimated that defensive 
medicine alone accounts for more than $45 billion in 
health care spending in the United States annually.3
Conversations about medical liability reform in 
the U.S. increasingly reflect an acknowledgment that 
traditional tort reform measures, such as caps on noneco-
nomic damages, have limited effectiveness in solving the 
system’s fundamental problems.4 There is also increas-
ing recognition that such reforms do little or nothing to 
make care safer.
Among the liability reform options that have 
recently received attention is administrative compensa-
tion of medical injuries. Under an administrative model, 
claims for medical injuries would be referred through a 
simplified process to an administrative body, sometimes 
called a “health court,” rather than to the regular judicial 
courts. Proposals for such a model typically suggest that 
the process be simple enough that claimants would not 
need the assistance of legal counsel; that cases be reviewed 
by claims handlers and neutral adjudicators who special-
ize in the evaluation of such claims; that the adjudicators 
be assisted by neutral medical experts; that compensation 
be awarded to patients without regard to whether the 
physician was negligent; and finally that noneconomic, 
or “pain and suffering,” damages be awarded according 
to a predetermined schedule based on the severity of 
the injury. Administrative compensation proposals are 
often labeled “no-fault” proposals, but in fact, they rarely 
suggest that compensation should be awarded on a true 
no-fault basis (meaning that the claimant need only show 
that the injury was causally related to medical care). Most 
would require that the injury also have been avoidable— 
a standard that is easier to meet than the negligence stan-
dard but still requires an evaluation of the quality of care 
that was provided.
Policymakers in the U.S. have raised many ques-
tions about how an administrative compensation system 
would operate here. The American experience with 
administrative compensation for medical injuries is 
quite limited. The federal Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program provides compensation on a no-fault basis for a 
defined set of injuries related to vaccine administration, 
and Florida and Virginia have long operated no-fault 
compensation funds for serious birth-related neurologi-
cal injuries.5 There are no precedents, however, for the 
types of broader schemes operated by Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and New Zealand. 
Policymakers considering how such schemes 
might work in the U.S. have raised several questions. 
How difficult is it to evaluate cases using a compensa-
tion standard other than negligence? How does a no-fault 
system deal with the problem of the doctor who should 
be sanctioned for gross or repeated deviations from the 
standard of care? What would such a system cost and 
how would it be financed? Do no-fault systems have the 
support of patients and doctors? Real-world experience 
from several countries that have implemented administra-
tive compensation systems for medical injuries sheds light 
on the answers to these questions. New Zealand and the 
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and 
Finland) have operated such systems for decades. In this 
issue brief, we discuss the experiences of New Zealand, 
Sweden, and Denmark, and consider lessons for reform 
of medical injury compensation systems in the United 
States.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION 
SYSTEMS ABROAD
New Zealand
In 1974, New Zealand introduced a comprehensive acci-
dental injury compensation scheme that was not limited 
to medical injuries. The system, which is managed by the 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), replaced 
injured individuals’ right to file personal injury lawsuits 
with an entitlement to rehabilitation and compensation 
via an administrative process. The change was motivated 
by a 1967 Report by the Woodhouse Commission that 
strongly criticized the tort system as an ineffective mecha-
nism for compensating and deterring injuries. There was 
also a perception that the concept of compensation based 
on individual fault no longer enjoyed broad support and 
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to 2009, LOF delegated responsibility for investigating 
and evaluating injury claims to a private claims handling 
company (Personskadereglering AB, or PSR), but these 
functions were integrated into LOF’s operations in 2010. 
Legislation in 1997 made it mandatory for all 
health care providers to carry liability insurance, with 
most insuring through the LOF as described above. 
A provider’s insurer pays for claims that arise out of 
the provider’s care and meet the criteria for compen-
sation. Because some providers do not comply with 
the requirement to carry insurance, the insurance 
companies formed the Patient Insurance Association 
(Patientförsäkringsföreningen, or PFF) for the purpose 
of making compensation available to patients injured by 
uninsured providers. The PFF also finances and oper-
ates a Patient Claims Panel to which patients can appeal 
compensation decisions regardless of whether or not the 
provider was insured.
As in New Zealand, the compensation system in 
Sweden is part of a larger, tax-funded system of social 
insurance, including a national health care system with 
universal access. The National Insurance Act of 1962 set 
up a system that covers basic medical expenses and wage 
loss due to illness of injury, regardless of cause, as well 
as disability and old age pensions. Sweden’s single-payer 
health care system provides comprehensive medical cov-
erage, with modest cost-sharing by patients. About 5 per-
cent of Swedes carry supplemental private health insur-
ance.8 Nearly all hospital care is provided through public 
sector hospitals and specialist physicians are generally 
salaried employees of the national health system. Primary 
care physicians may be either government employees 
working in public clinics or private practitioners.9
Denmark
Denmark’s medical injury compensation system, adopted 
in the Patient Insurance Act of 1992, is very similar to 
Sweden’s. It was modeled after Sweden’s 1975 voluntary 
scheme and motivated by similar concerns about patient 
access to compensation.10 
By law, Danish regional hospital authorities are 
required to pay the costs of malpractice claims. Although 
they have the option to purchase insurance through a 
should be replaced by a principle of community responsi-
bility for accidental injuries.6 
The ACC is tax funded, government operated, 
and accountable to a parliamentary minister (Table 1). 
It functions alongside a national health care system that 
provides care to all New Zealanders. Most hospital care is 
provided through public sector hospitals, although there 
are many smaller, private facilities as well. Most specialist 
physicians are employed by hospitals, while general prac-
titioners operate private practices and are merely paid by 
the government. Hospital care is provided free of charge, 
while primary care is available with small copayments. 
About a third of New Zealanders have supplementary 
private health insurance.7 New Zealand maintains a web 
of other, tax-funded social insurance programs, including 
sickness and disability benefits, unemployment benefits, 
and retirement benefits. 
Sweden
In 1975, Sweden established a voluntary scheme in which 
public and private health care providers assumed respon-
sibility for compensating injured patients through a con-
sortium of insurers. The impetus for reform was a per-
ception that compensation was too difficult for patients 
to obtain in the tort system, which required plaintiffs to 
meet a higher standard of proof than the “preponderance 
of the evidence” standard used in personal injury litiga-
tion in the U.S. The process was protracted and expen-
sive. As a result, very few claims were brought and even 
fewer resulted in compensation. 
The objective of the new system was to chan-
nel compensation more efficiently to injured patients. 
Disciplining health care providers and deterring medi-
cal errors were not among its missions. On the contrary, 
system designers eschewed these goals because they were 
regarded as potentially corrosive to the compensation 
objective.
In 1995, the voluntary system was restruc-
tured and a mutual insurance company (Landstingens 
Ömsesidiga Försäkringsbolag, or LOF) owned by the 
regional hospital authorities began insuring all public 
hospitals and physicians, as well as private providers 
who have a contract with the government. From 1995 
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private insurance company, in practice, it has been more 
cost-effective to self-insure. The insurance companies 
and self-insuring authorities formed a joint association, 
the Patient Insurance Association (Patientforsikringen, 
or PIA) to evaluate all claims in accordance with the law. 
The PIA is an independent association governed by a 
board of directors made up primarily of regional council 
members. Compensation payments to patients are made 
by the self-insured county councils.
Denmark has a tax-funded national health care 
system with universal, free access. The counties are legally 
and financially responsible for all treatment, from pri-
mary to tertiary care. There is no cost-sharing by patients 
for hospital or primary care services, but there is modest 
cost-sharing for prescription drugs and certain other ser-
vices. About 30 percent of Danes carry supplemental pri-
vate health insurance to cover these costs.11 Most hospi-
tals are publicly operated, while most health professionals 
are self-employed and reimbursed by the government.12 
Denmark also maintains social insurance schemes for 
sickness and disability, unemployment, and retirement 
income.
FINDINGS
1. The systems have rejected the notion that com-
pensation should be available only to patients who 
are injured by negligence. 
New Zealand has experimented with several alternatives 
to a negligence standard. Originally, it compensated all 
medical “misadventures,” a term that was interpreted 
by claims handlers, the courts, and eventually a statute 
to include two kinds of injuries: “medical error” and 
“medical mishap.” A medical error was an injury due to 
negligence, defined as it is in tort law. A medical mishap 
was a rare and severe adverse consequence of treatment 
given properly by a registered health professional. 
Legislation enacted in 2005 eliminated fault-based 
negligence determinations from the system, adopting a 
single “treatment injury” standard. Under this standard, 
there must be a physical injury causally related to treat-
ment by a registered health professional that is not a 
necessary part or ordinary consequence of the treatment. 
This standard comes closest to a true no-fault standard 
in any of the foreign schemes, although questions of 
appropriateness still arise in determining the eligibility 
for compensation of claims relating to failures to provide 
timely treatment or failures to obtain informed consent.
The 2005 change was motivated by several con-
cerns: the sense that the medical error standard adversely 
affected physician–patient relationships and reduced phy-
sicians’ willingness to participate in the claims process; 
a desire to put medical injuries on equal footing with 
other kinds of accidental injuries, which were eligible for 
ACC compensation without regard to fault; the sense 
that learning opportunities were lost by focusing on indi-
vidual error rather than systems of care; and a dissatisfac-
tion with the cost of investigating medical injury cases to 
determine whether an error occurred.13
In Sweden and Denmark, a standard of “avoid-
ability” is applied. Injuries are compensable if they would 
not have occurred in the hands of a highly skilled and 
experienced physician in the relevant specialty—a stan-
dard quite different from negligence, which compensates 
only those injuries resulting from care that fell below 
the customary standard of care that would be rendered 
by a reasonable practitioner. The avoidability inquiry 
Methods
In 2005, we made site visits to Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Wellington to interview administrators and stake-
holders of the Swedish, Danish, and New Zealand medical injury compensation systems. We conducted semi-
structured interviews with a total of 44 key informants, including heads of the systems, frontline claims handlers, 
medical expert consultants, legal advisors, judges, and medical professional organization leaders. In addition to 
interview findings, this issue brief incorporates data and informational materials provided by the system admin-
istrators, including updated data from 2009 to 2010, as well as a review of relevant scholarship concerning the 
systems’ history and operation.
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examines not only the skill and conscientiousness of the 
physician in rendering the treatment but also whether 
an alternative technique or treatment would have met 
the patient’s needs and been less dangerous. The Danes 
evaluate avoidability based on what was known at the 
time care decisions were made, while the Swedes evaluate 
it retrospectively, incorporating all information avail-
able at the time the question of compensation is decided 
(which is a more permissive standard for patients than 
Denmark’s known-at-the-time standard). Although 
the avoidability standard governs the payment of most 
claims, the Swedish and Danish schemes also apply other 
criteria to compensate certain unavoidable injuries. For 
example, a wide range of treatment-related injuries that 
are more rare and severe in nature than what a patient 
should reasonably be expected to endure are compen-
sated in Denmark; Sweden covers a narrower group of 
unavoidable injuries caused by equipment failures or 
severe hospital-acquired infections.
These compensation criteria tend to lead to 
similar compensation outcomes for the same injury, but 
through different reasoning. (See Table 2 for an example.) 
All are more likely to result in compensation to injured 
patients than is the U.S. standard of negligence. System 
administrators in each of the three countries reported 
that their compensation criteria were workable in practice 
and, in their opinion, were preferable to a negligence 
standard.
2. The systems have been able to provide a simple, 
fast, accessible process for obtaining compensation 
that preserves physician–patient relationships. 
In all three systems, claims can be filed free of charge 
without the need for assistance of legal counsel, although 
lawyers do participate in filing about 10 percent of claims 
in Denmark (Exhibit 1). Sweden allows only patients to 
submit claims, while Denmark also permits hospitals to 
file claims on behalf of patients. New Zealand requires 
that patients initiate a claim through a physician or other 
recognized health care provider, who need not be the cli-
nician involved in the injury. In Sweden, an estimated 60 
percent to 80 percent of claims are facilitated by health 
care providers on behalf of patients—sometimes by the 
physician involved in the incident, and sometimes by a 
primary care physician.14 In Denmark, physicians file 
about 15 percent of claims and assist in most other cases. 
In New Zealand, 46 percent of treatment injury claims 
are lodged by patients’ primary care providers, who 
receive reimbursement for the time they spent filing the 
claim if the claim is accepted. Of the remaining claims, 
44 percent are filed by public or private hospital staff, 
and 10 percent by other providers, on behalf of patients.
All of the systems report that jettisoning neg-
ligence determinations has been effective in enabling 
clinicians and patients to maintain their therapeutic 
relationship and cooperate in the pursuit of compensa-
tion. Moreover, although the easier claiming process has 
resulted in higher rates of claims than are seen in the 
U.S., as seen in Table 3, it has not opened the floodgates 
to an unmanageable number of claims. System adminis-
trators estimate that about 10 percent of injured patients 
file claims, as compared with 2 percent to 3 percent in 
the U.S. Finally, the systems are able to process claims 
expeditiously. Whereas in the U.S., the average time from 
injury to disposition of a malpractice claim is five years, 
in Sweden and Denmark it is eight months. In New 
Zealand it is 16 days, although where there are allega-
tions of failure to treat or delayed treatment, claims may 
take longer to investigate. Patients infrequently appeal 
the initial decision and, when they do, generally are not 
successful. 
3. The systems have been able to effectively use 
neutral medical experts as well as information on 
previous, similar cases to help render consistent 
compensation decisions. 
In Sweden and Denmark, the frontline claims handlers 
in the systems typically do not have clinical backgrounds, 
but are in all cases assisted by a panel of senior physicians 
in a range of specialties. These physicians are retained by 
the compensation system through standing contracts, 
with most serving for an extended period of time and 
accumulating substantial experience and institutional 
memory. For decisions that are not clear-cut, the claims 
handlers and medical experts may also examine past deci-
sions in similar cases, which are available in a searchable 
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database. In addition to fostering consistency in decision-
making, review of prior decisions has proved effective in 
reducing the time and labor necessary to decide cases, as 
reviewers are not reinventing the appropriate methodol-
ogy with each new case.
In New Zealand, the claims assessors have clinical 
backgrounds (often in nursing) and do not necessarily 
consult specialist clinicians in every case. Approximately 
two-thirds of claims are decided in house by a peer-
review panel comprising these assessors and team manag-
ers. Advice may also be sought from one of the in-house 
medical advisors. Independent experts with the relevant 
scope of practice are, however, typically consulted in 
complex cases or where the claim alleges failure to treat 
or delayed treatment. In such cases, the causal connec-
tion between the medical management and the injury 
tends to be less clear, necessitating greater investigation 
and expertise to reach a judgment about eligibility for 
compensation.
4. Although they compensate a broader range of 
injuries than the U.S. tort system, the foreign sys-
tems’ costs have not been exorbitant. 
Based on medical injury studies conducted in the U.S., 
about twice as many injuries are eligible for compensa-
tion under an avoidability standard than under a neg-
ligence standard, and three to four times as many are 
eligible under a true no-fault standard.15 However, several 
factors have kept costs manageable in the systems that 
employ these alternative standards.16 First, the availabil-
ity of other social insurance programs obviates the need 
for some injured individuals to file injury compensation 
claims, keeping claiming rates relatively low in com-
parison to the estimated prevalence of medical injuries. 
For example, a New Zealand patient who sustained a 
disabling injury could receive free or very low-cost care 
through the national health care system as well as dis-
ability and unemployment benefits that are generous 
by U.S. standards. The availability of other sources of 
support also keeps average claims costs lower because 
Injury is 
identied 
Claim is led 
Claim is 
reviewed 
Initial decision 
Appeal 
Patient les, usually 
with attorney 
Insurer investigates; 
lay jury decides if no 
settlement reached 
On average, 3 years 
from ling date 
To appellate court 
Patient has 3 years 
from discovery or 10 
years from treatment 
date to le a claim 
Patient les 
Claims handler 
investigates and 
decides 
70% decided within 8 
months of ling date 
To district court 
Patient has 5 years 
from discovery or 10 
years from treatment 
date to le a claim 
Patient or 
physician les 
Claims handler 
investigates and 
decides 
On average, 7 months 
from ling date 
To district court 
No time limitation on 
ling a claim 
Physician les for 
patient 
Claims handler 
investigates and 
decides 
On average, 7 months 
from ling date (16 days 
for “treatment injury”) 
To district court 
United States Sweden Denmark New Zealand 
Adapted from: A. B. Kachalia, M. M. Mello, T. A. Brennan et al., “Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation,” Social Science & 
Medicine, Jan. 2008 66(2):387–402.
Exhibit 1. The Medical Injury Compensation Process in Four Countries
Patient typically has 3 
years from discovery to le 
a claim, but varies by state
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“collateral-source offset” rules stipulate that the medi-
cal injury systems need not pay for lost wages, medical 
expenses, and other expenses that are covered by the 
national insurance system.17 
Second, these systems have low overhead costs—
around 17 percent of the total cost of the system, com-
pared to an estimated 55 percent to 60 percent in the 
U.S. Third, Sweden and Denmark impose a cap on 
the total compensation a patient may receive (Table 1). 
Fourth, payments for noneconomic losses are much 
smaller than is typically the case in the U.S. 
Because of these features, the average total award 
size in these systems is much lower than in the U.S. 
In 2009, the average compensation per paid claim was 
approximately US$20,000 in Sweden and US$40,000 
in Denmark, compared to approximately $324,000 in 
the U.S.18 In New Zealand, it was even lower, around 
US$4,450. 
5. The systems use fixed award amounts, schedules, 
and caps to make payments for noneconomic  
loss, provoking controversy about the adequacy  
of awards. 
New Zealand provides lump sum payments for noneco-
nomic loss associated with permanent impairment (the 
loss, or loss of use, of a bodily part, system, or function). 
However, the payments historically have generated some 
controversy because they are relatively modest (currently 
capped at US$85,500), have been adjusted only infre-
quently, and are conditional on permanent impairment, 
meaning that individuals whose impairment is temporary 
or whose injuries involve pain but not impairment do  
not have their noneconomic loss compensated.19 Sweden 
and Denmark calculate noneconomic damages in accor-
dance with pre-established tables, or schedules, which  
are adjusted annually for inflation. In these systems, pain 
and disfigurement is compensated even if not disabling, 
but there are sometimes complaints of inadequate com-
pensation for severe injuries, particularly in Denmark, 
where maximum total awards are capped at about 
US$1.7 million. 
6. The systems are complemented by strong, inde-
pendent, parallel systems of physician discipline. 
Each of the countries has chosen to delink its patient 
compensation system from its system of policing phy-
sician competence to assure health care quality. Since 
1994, New Zealand’s Office of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner has provided a mechanism for patients to 
complain about the quality of health care and disability 
services. By law, all patients who file a compensation 
claim with ACC must be informed of the availability of 
the complaints process. The commissioner investigates 
patient complaints and may pursue a variety of rem-
edies where complaints are found to have merit. These 
remedies range from facilitating mediation and apol-
ogy to referring the case to a prosecutorial authority for 
disciplinary action to recommending that a health care 
organization improve its care processes.20 Sweden and 
Denmark also operate separate systems of physician dis-
cipline, with boards for patients’ complaints empowered 
to investigate complaints and refer cases to disciplinary 
authorities. 
None of these countries currently permits rou-
tine information sharing between the discipline system 
and the compensation system, although this has only 
been the case in New Zealand since 2005. New Zealand 
also requires the ACC to make a report to the Director 
General of Health if, based on a pattern of claims, condi-
tions in a facility appear to pose a threat to the public. In 
rare cases, ACC may make a similar report regarding an 
individual health professional to the relevant registration 
authority. 
A perceived advantage of the information firewall 
is that it encourages physicians to make patients aware 
of their right to seek compensation and to assist them in 
claiming, which physicians might be reluctant to do if 
they feared a compensation claim could trigger or facili-
tate disciplinary action. On the other hand, operating 
completely separate systems of discipline and compensa-
tion has some disadvantages: health care providers may 
feel besieged by multiple investigations and the lack 
of information sharing contributes to inefficiency and 
redundancy in the investigation process.21 Some have also 
criticized the New Zealand and Scandinavian systems 
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for eliminating any possible deterrent effect of the injury 
compensation system on medical negligence, while others 
argue that there is little evidence that deterrence occurs in 
the U.S. system. 
7. The systems utilize claims data for purposes of 
learning about opportunities for patient safety 
improvement. 
The centralized nature of the compensation schemes 
confers a huge informational advantage. In contrast, in 
the U.S., data about medical injuries are fragmented 
across hundreds of insurance companies that usually do 
not share or pool the information they control (Table 4). 
With larger databases, the possibilities for detecting and 
analyzing patterns of medical injuries are much greater. 
The country approaches described above make good use 
of the information at their disposal, although administra-
tors from all three systems believe more could be done. 
Within the last five years, New Zealand’s ACC has inte-
grated treatment injury claim data with its overall claims 
management database. It shares data obtained from 
claims analysis with hospitals, health professionals, and 
professional organizations through presentations, profil-
ing, and publication of injury case studies.
The Danish and Swedish systems also maintain 
comprehensive databases of injury information. Rather 
than assign an in-house team to analyze the data, as 
the ACC does, the Danish PIA partners with external 
researchers using data-sharing agreements. The Swedish 
LOF collaborates with external researchers and also 
conducts descriptive analyses of its own data. Both the 
Danish and Swedish systems disseminate findings to hos-
pitals through briefs and presentations, provide hospitals 
with benchmarking information, and encourage hospitals 
to perform root-cause analyses on serious incidents.
CONCLUSIONS 
There is broad agreement within the countries we studied 
that the medical injury compensation schemes have met 
their primary objective of improving injured patients’ 
access to compensation. Although controversies have 
arisen over time about the appropriate compensation 
standard and the adequacy of compensation awards, the 
systems have become firmly entrenched. There has been 
no discussion of returning to a fault-based system of tort 
liability for medical injuries. Strong, separate systems of 
complaints investigation and physician discipline appear 
to have allayed any concern that injury deterrence may 
be undermined by a move to a compensation system that 
does not involve judgments of fault or economic penal-
ties for clinicians. Available data are inadequate to answer 
the question of whether health care in New Zealand, 
Denmark and Sweden is safer than in the U.S., but the 
medical injury compensation schemes do create an envi-
ronment that is more conducive to transparency and 
safety improvement.
Lessons for the U.S. from Denmark,  
New Zealand, and Sweden
In looking at the administrative compensation systems 
for medical injury in Denmark, New Zealand, and 
Sweden, one needs to recognize that the context within 
which these systems operate is very different from that in 
the United States. These countries are smaller and more 
sociodemographically homogeneous, their health care 
systems are government-run and universally accessible, 
and they maintain a much stronger social insurance safety 
net. Culturally, there is less of a tradition of litigiousness 
and of challenging physicians’ authority. Given these dif-
ferences, could an administrative compensation model 
work in the U.S.?
The available research indicates that, despite dif-
ferences in health care systems and cultures, most fea-
tures of these country models are readily applicable to 
the U.S. system. A private financing scheme, similar to 
the Swedish model, is likely to be the most feasible for 
the U.S. The responsibility for initial investigation of an 
incident would presumably remain where it currently 
lies, with private insurers, although it should be expe-
dited and take a much less defensive approach—similar 
to the approach taken in the U.S. in the emerging “dis-
closure-and-offer” model of early settlement.22 Because 
of insurers’ financial interest in cost control, it would be 
important to provide a neutral, external panel to inves-
tigate and adjudicate claims in the event that the insurer 
and patient do not reach a satisfactory agreement about 
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compensation. In some states, constitutional barriers may 
make it difficult to make an administrative compensation 
system the exclusive remedy available to injured patients, 
but there are still possibilities for voluntary systems even 
in those jurisdictions.23
Cost control in an injury compensation system 
would be more of a challenge in the U.S. than in for-
eign countries. It would be feasible to cap awards, as 
half of U.S. states currently do. However, it is unlikely 
that Americans would accept a system that awarded the 
relatively modest compensation amounts provided in the 
foreign systems. Average awards would likely be much 
higher in the U.S. because of public expectations and 
because private insurance would likely cover a smaller 
share of medical expenses than the single-payer health 
systems abroad. The proportion of injured patients who 
file claims may also be higher in the U.S. There is a 
strong tradition of seeking compensation for injuries in 
the U.S., and the skimpier social insurance safety net 
in the U.S. creates a greater financial necessity for filing 
claims. 
Two factors may serve as countervailing forces to 
these cost drivers in the U.S. One is the increased preva-
lence of health insurance coverage that will accompany 
federal health reform. This should leave fewer patients 
with unmet medical needs thus driving down the rate of 
claims in the compensation system, and create greater 
potential for collateral source offsets by limiting the size 
of awards from the compensation system. The second is 
the enormous potential for reducing administrative over-
head costs in the U.S. Some analyses suggest that these 
savings alone would offset the effects of having more 
claims filed.24
Because many Americans continue to believe 
that the tort system creates valuable incentives for safe, 
high-quality care, it would be politically advantageous to 
improve systems of physician discipline in the U.S. prior 
to pursuing implementation of an administrative com-
pensation system. Although there is scant evidence that 
tort liability has had a positive deterrent effect, key stake-
holders are more likely to accept a no-fault system if there 
are other means of identifying incompetent providers 
and holding clinicians accountable for poor-quality care. 
Physician discipline systems in the U.S. are not viewed 
as robust mechanisms for policing physician quality, and 
stronger professional regulation and oversight will likely 
be required to make an alternative injury compensation 
system palatable. The international experience attests 
fairly strongly that the injury compensation system itself 
need not—and probably should not—play a disciplinary 
role with physicians.
Perhaps the strongest lesson to be learned from the 
international examples is that replacing the negligence 
standard with a more liberal, less stigmatizing com-
pensation standard such as avoidability reaps multiple 
benefits. In addition to easing injured patients’ access to 
compensation for preventable injuries, it preserves physi-
cian–patient relationships, encourages transparency about 
adverse events, and fosters physician participation in the 
claims process. In this way, an administrative compensa-
tion system can help move American health care toward 
the culture of safety necessary to prevent medical injuries.
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Table 1. Medical Injury Compensation System Overview
United States Sweden Denmark New Zealand
Administering 
body
State and federal 
courts
Insurance companies, 
primarily the public 
company (“LOF”)
Public company
(“PIA”)
Government agency 
(“ACC”)
Who pays for 
awards?
Private insurance 
companies, using 
premiums collected 
from health care 
providers
Insurance companies. 
Compensation from 
LOF is financed by 
county councils
Self-insured regional 
hospital authorities, 
using tax revenue
ACC, using revenue 
from general and 
employer taxes
Compensation 
standard
Injury was caused 
by negligent medical 
management
Injury was an 
avoidable outcome 
of medical 
management‡ 
Injury was an 
avoidable outcome 
of medical 
management‡
Injury was an 
unexpected outcome 
of treatment by a 
registered health 
professional
Limits on 
compensation§
Varies from state to 
statet
Total awards capped 
at US$1.2 million
Total awards capped 
at US$1.7 million
No cap on economic 
loss compensation; 
noneconomic loss 
compensation capped 
at US$85,500
Sources: A. B. Kachalia, M. M. Mello, T. A. Brennan et al., “Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation,” Social Science & Medicine, Jan. 2008 66(2):387–402; 
and personal communications with program administrators. 
§ In the foreign schemes, medical care would be provided by the national health care system above and beyond these compensation limits. In the U.S., some states deduct the 
value of benefits received from other sources, including health insurance coverage, from malpractice awards, while others do not. 
t State tort reform laws create variation in available compensation. Six states limit total damages, while about half limit noneconomic damages, to amounts ranging from $250,000 
to over $1 million. 
‡ In addition to avoidable injuries, the system also compensates certain kinds of severe, unavoidable injuries. In evaluating avoidability, Sweden examines all information available 
at the time of the compensation review, while Denmark examines only the information available at the time of the incident.
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Table 2. Case Example: A Surgical Patient Injured by an Allergic Reaction to Latex Gloves
Case Summary An unconscious patient is admitted for emergency surgery after being seen in a hospital’s 
emergency department. The patient has not previously been seen at the hospital and is 
unaccompanied by friends or family, so hospital staff do not realize that the patient is allergic 
to latex. The prevalence of latex allergies in the population is less than 1 percent. The surgical 
team wears latex gloves during the operation, causing a severe anaphylactic reaction in the 
patient. The patient spends 7 days in the intensive care unit on a ventilator before recovering. 
Is this injury eligible for compensation?
United States No. Because latex allergy is rare and the hospital staff had no reason to suspect that the 
patent had an allergy, and because the use of latex gloves during surgery is the customary 
standard of care, there is no negligence.
Sweden Yes. Although the staff did not know about the latex allergy at the time care was rendered, 
it would be apparent at the time the case was considered for compensation. Applying a 
“retrospective” analysis, the injury is avoidable in light of all the information available at the 
time of review. It could have been avoided by not using latex products in the operating room.
Denmark Yes. Although the staff did not know about the latex allergy at the time care was rendered and 
no retrospective analysis would be applied, it qualifies for compensation as an unavoidable but 
rare event that is severe beyond what a patient should reasonably be expected to endure.
New Zealand Yes. The injury was an unexpected outcome of the treatment received.
Source: A. B. Kachalia, M. M. Mello, T. A. Brennan et al., “Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation,” Social Science & Medicine, Jan. 2008 66(2):387–402.
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Table 3. Claims Rates and System Overhead Costs
United States Sweden Denmark New Zealand
Annual claims rate  
(per million persons) 200 1,000 1,330 2,000
Initial claim success rate 56% 45% 34% 63%
Average amount paid US$323,816 US$20,000 US$40,000 US$4,450
Claimant appeal rate Not available 10% 12% 4%
Appeal success rate Not available 10% 2% 14%
Overall claim success rate Not available 45% 34% 68%
Overhead costs 54% 16% 17% Unknown
Sources: A. B. Kachalia, M. M. Mello, T. A. Brennan et al., “Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation,” Social Science & Medicine, Jan. 2008 
66(2):387–402; K. Oliphant, “Beyond Misadventure: Compensation for Medical Injuries in New Zealand,” Medical Law Review, Autumn 2007 15(3):357–91; Public Citizen, 
“Medical Malpractice Payments Fall Again in 2009,” http://www.citizen.org/documents/NPDBFinal.pdf, April 14, 2011; H. Johansson, “The Swedish System for Compensation of 
Patient Injuries,” Upsala Journal of Medical Sciences, May 2010 115(2): 88–90; D. M. Studdert, M. M. Mello, A. A. Gawande et al., “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments 
in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 2006 354(19): 2024–33; Patienforsikringen, “Figures for 2009,” http://www.patientforsikringen.dk/da/
Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/statistik-2009.aspx (Sept. 3, 2010); and J. Downie, W. Lahey, D. Ford et al., Patient Safety Law: From Silos to Systems, Appendix 2: Country Reports—
Denmark (Health Canada, March 2006), http://www.energyk.com/healthlaw/documents/Appendix_2_Denmark.pdf.
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Table 4. Relationship of Compensation Systems to Patient Safety Initiatives
United States Sweden Denmark New Zealand
Use of 
compensation 
decisions as 
data for safety 
research
No centralized 
repository for 
information on all 
filed claims. Closed-
claim databases 
have limited scope 
and information.
Details of all claims 
are logged in a 
database. Data are 
available to external 
researchers.
Details of all claims 
are logged in a 
database. Data are 
available to external 
researchers. PIA 
maintains copies of 
associated medical 
records to support 
detailed studies.
Details of all claims are 
logged in a database. 
Hospitals may request 
their own data. Data are 
not otherwise externally 
accessible.
Safety analyses 
performed by 
compensation 
system
None LOF analyzes claims 
data and prepares 
presentations 
on safety issues 
for hospitals and 
regions. LOF sends 
hospitals facility-level 
comparisons of claims 
rates, injury types, 
and other information. 
LOF does no root-
cause analysis, 
but gives hospitals 
data and economic 
incentives to do so.
PIA does no safety 
analysis itself 
but partners with 
external researchers 
to conduct and 
publish safety 
studies. PIA sends 
hospitals facility-
level comparisons 
of claims rates, 
injury types, and 
other information.
ACC performs analyses 
using the database. 
ACC writes and shares 
information with the 
health sector.
Information 
sharing with 
patient safety 
regulators
None None PIA shares 
information about 
drug-related claims 
with the national 
regulatory body.
If ACC believes there 
is a risk of harm to the 
public, it must report it to 
the relevant regulatory 
authority. 
Source: M. M. Mello, D. M. Studdert, A. B. Kachalia et al., “‘Health Courts’ and Accountability for Patient Safety,” Milbank Quarterly, 2006 84(3):459–92.
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